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My research centers on three broad substantive interests in international political economy (IPE). The centerpiece of my research program is understanding the ways in which politics of trade and finance overlap and interact to produce global patterns of economic development. I'm also interested in how international economic cooperation and domestic politics shape and constrain one another. Finally, some of my works in progress reflect my interest in the earlier history of global capital markets, critical historical junctures of financial institutional change and their intersection with comparative political economy and/or international conflict. Beyond my substantive interests in international relations, I am invested in adopting network science to applicable topics in IPE. 

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[Book Project] Varieties of Globalization: Trade Openness, Bank Lobbying, and the Political Economy of Financial Liberalization

One conventional wisdom of the international political economy literature is that finance follows trade. There are substantial variations, however, among countries that are similarly integrated into the global economy that have chosen different levels of financial liberalization. Why do some countries develop larger, deeper, and more globalized financial markets than others? I examine this question with a new framework that studies how a country's position in the global trading system shapes domestic banks' incentive to lobby for financial market policies. 

International Cooperation during Economic Shocks: The Political Consequences of US Currency Swap Arrangements (with Sujeong Shim) [current version]

Can international cooperation affect public opinion and possibly reverse the anti-incumbent sentiments during economic shocks? We examine this question by analyzing the effect of the US Federal Reserve’s Currency Swap Arrangements (CSAs). We find that governments with Fed CSAs enjoy stronger public support during times of crises than those without CSAs.

Divided We Fall, United We Prosper? Partisan Politics in the Negotiation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (with Andrew McWard) [current version]

How does domestic partisanship affect international cooperation? We evaluate the success of international cooperation outcomes in terms of formation and durability of  bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Democracies form BITs to generate a credible commitment against future regulation of foreign investment. But the success of this commitment is conditioned by the partisanship of the leading executive and the subsequent size of their legislative win-set at the time of signing the treaty.